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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
According to the theory of international trade the absence of transport costs and trade 
restrictions and the possibility for perfect arbitrage lead to homogeneous goods being 
uniformly priced across countries – a relationship also known as the law of one price. 
Empirical research however shows that “... [in] reality the law of one price is flagrantly and 
systematically violated”1. This includes famous studies on the prices for Big Mac 
hamburgers2, the Economist magazine3 and IKEA furniture4 that show evidence of price 
differences for the same products across countries.  
The efforts of the European Union aim at the reduction of trade barriers between Member 
States. In this spirit the Directive 2003/54/EC set the ground for an integrated European 
electricity market. Its goal is to liberalize and harmonize the Electricity Supply Industry of the 
Member States. The electricity market however, has some unique characteristics that 
distinguish it from markets for other goods and services. The physical properties of electricity 
require its production and consumption to take place at the same time. This involves a broad 
range of issues concerning coordination and transportation. Additionally there are vast 
investments required to set up the needed infrastructure of networks and facilities. 
Traditionally this led to a market structure of vertically integrated companies that took over 
the entire production and supply chain, forming monopolies that were prone with 
inefficiencies and prevented potential competitors from entering the market. Therefore the 
measures of Directive 2003/54/EC include the vertical disintegration of the competitive parts 
of generation and supply from the natural monopolies of transmission and distribution. 
Additionally it aims at integrating the electricity markets of the Member States and at aligning 
                                                             
1 Isard (1977), p. 942 
2 Cumby (1996) 
3 Ghosh & Wolf (1994) 
4 Haskel & Wolf (2001) 
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national electricity policies. This should ultimately lead to more competition in the electricity 
market and price harmonization. 
 
1.2 AIM 
The aim of our study is to test whether the law of one price is applicable to the electricity 
market in Europe. We further intend to identify factors that can help explain possible 
differences in electricity prices across Europe. These include trade factors, cost factors and 
institutional factors.  
 
1.3 DATA AND METHOD 
The data used in this study comes from the Statistical Office of the European Commission 
Eurostat. The data is complemented by the Report on Progress in Creating the Internal Gas 
and Electricity Market conducted by the European Commission. The dataset will be analyzed 
using descriptive statistics and ordinary least squares regression techniques. 
 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
Following the Introduction Chapter, Chapter 2 will give an overview of the structure and 
characteristics of the Electricity Supply Industry. Chapter 3 then provides a survey of 
previous research as well as experiences from electricity liberalization both worldwide and in 
Europe. The theory on the law of one price will be presented in Chapter 4. The methodology 
and model specification will be presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 gives a description of the 
data and variables used in the study and presents the descriptive statistics of the electricity 
sector in Europe. The results obtained from the linear regressions will be provided in Chapter 
7, followed by a discussion in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 draws the conclusions of the study. 
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2 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
The Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) can be illustrated as a sequential process consisting of 
generation, transmission and distribution and finally supply of electricity. There are only 
limited and very expensive storage possibilities for electric power which requires the 
generation and consumption of it to take place simultaneously. Moreover, the segments of 
transmission and distribution are natural monopolies. This has implications on the 
requirements for the transmission and distribution network as well as the resulting market 
structure. In order to provide an understanding of the ESI we review its functional segments 
in Chapter 2.1 and market structure in Chapter 2.2 as well as the implications of natural 
monopolies and their regulation in Chapter 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. 
 
2.1 FUNCTIONAL SEGMENTS 
The main areas of business in the ESI consist of generation and sales of electricity on the one 
hand and transmission and distribution of it on the other hand. An overview of the process of 
electricity provision is given in Figure 1. Accordingly, electricity is first generated from 
various fuel sources such as oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear power, but also renewable sources 
like wind turbines, hydro power and photovoltaic technologies. Steiner5 illustrates the cost 
structure of the ESI in the United Kingdom where generation is attributed the major part of 
the cost, about 65% of the final electricity price. Moreover, transmission adds 10%, 
distribution 20% and finally the supply 5% to the final price.  
In the process of electricity generation the major cost factors are fuel prices, capital costs, and 
operational costs. But also the performance of the underlying generation technology (capacity, 
thermal efficiency, and operating life) plays a role in the cost structure. There are e.g. high 
capital costs associated with nuclear technology, resulting from long construction and retiring 
times as well as costly waste disposal. However, the variable costs for fuel and overall 
operation are relatively low. The costs of coal, oil, and natural gas fired generation on the 
other hand show lower capital costs but fuel prices are more volatile and generally higher than 
                                                             
5 Steiner, Faye (2001) 
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for nuclear generation. Hydro power has generally low variable costs; the overall costs 
however, depend for the most part on local geography as well as climate.  
 
Figure 1 Functional Segments of Electricity Production  
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Source:  based on Wild6  
The generated electricity is transported via the so called “wire” functions, with transmission 
being the high-voltage and distribution the low-voltage transport of electricity7. Additionally, 
these segments also carry out the coordination of scattered generators in the grid in order to 
sustain proper voltage and frequency and to prevent blackouts.  
Transmission and distribution are considered to be natural monopolies since competition in 
these areas would result in duplications of high and low voltage networks and thus raise 
                                                             
6 2001, pp. 17-23 
7 see Appendix 
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transportation costs. Unlike transmission and distribution, the generation and supply of 
electricity can be organized in a competitive manner. The suppliers’ responsibility is then the 
wholesale and retail sale of electricity to consumers. This involves also tasks such as 
marketing, billing, metering, credit control and risk management.  
 
2.2 MARKET STRUCTURE 
The physics of electricity require the generation, transport and consumption to take place at 
the same time. As a result, all these business activities have been traditionally vertically 
integrated within the same company in order to cut transaction costs and reduce uncertainty 
since one firm has all the required information and thus can manage the daily operations more 
smoothly. Kühn and Vives8 define vertical integration as “...vertical merger or [...] set of 
vertical restraints that eliminate the externalities between the upstream and downstream 
firms...”. An overview of different degrees of integration is given in Figure 1. Thus, a 
vertically integrated company on the electricity market operates all functional segments from 
generation to transmission and distribution, and the supply of electricity (Figure 1a). Opposite 
to vertical integration, in vertically separated companies generation and supply are entirely 
separated from the transmission and distribution (Figure 1c). In-between the two extremes is 
a situation where just the generation of power faces a competitive market while other business 
areas remain monopolistic (Figure 1b). Thus, there are many producers in the market but just 
one grid company taking care of the distribution, transmission and supply of electricity, a so 
called single buyer. 
In absence of regulation, vertically integrated monopolies raise several concerns. They may 
impede access to the market for other companies. The grid provider may require a smaller 
charge for the use of the grid from its own subsidiaries, giving them a cost advantage over 
new entrants. With scarce network capacities, the grid provider could treat transmission and 
distribution of electricity preferentially for the own subsidiaries.  
Furthermore, vertical integration raises special issues like predatory pricing and cross-
subsidisation. Predatory pricing occurs when the monopolistic firm sets its prices below the 
short run marginal costs in the competitive part of the market, so that competing firms are not 
                                                             
8  Kühn and Vives 1999, p. 576 
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able to survive. The monopoly firm is making losses as well, but it is counting on its 
possibilities to raise the prices later to pay off the losses.  
In the case of cross-subsidization the firm is making losses in the competitive area of business 
activity but it supports the unsuccessful activity with the profits of the monopoly part of its 
business activities9. If the network owner subsidises its own production units, even efficiently 
run companies are driven out of the market, thus hampering competition and leading to 
efficiency losses. 
 
2.3 NATURAL MONOPOLY 
Natural monopolies typically arise with large networks and utilities for the provision of such 
goods as gas, electricity, water or telecommunication. In the ESI the transmission and 
distribution of electricity comprise a natural monopoly. The reason for that is a market 
situation where a single supplier can supply to the markets more cost efficiently than two or 
more suppliers. This situation is also known as economies of scope across production 
systems, represented by the following cost function: 
(2.1) 
 
 
where C are the costs of production and x is the produced quantity. The implication is that it is 
more beneficial to let only one firm produce the whole output than to let a higher amount of 
firms produce smaller parts of the output10. In the case of electricity, all companies provide 
the same product, the infrastructure required is immense, and the cost of adding one more 
customer is negligible. As long as the average cost of serving customers is decreasing, one 
firm will more efficiently serve the entire customer base.  
Increasing returns to scale are another distinct feature of natural monopolies that also plays an 
important role in the electricity distribution industry11. Here, a proportional increase of input 
factors results in a more than proportionate increase of the output. According to Perner and 
                                                             
9 Baumol & Sidak, 1995 
10  Knieps 2001, p. 23 
11 Knieps 2001, pp. 24-25 
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Riechmann12 economies of scale lead to cost savings since the shared use of the distribution 
and transmission grids allows for larger generation facilities. Since there are several 
generators in the network there is less reserve capacity needed which can be used to provide 
more customers with electricity, thus reducing both the costs and investment risk. 
For the analysis of natural monopolies the concept of contestable markets enables the 
investigation of a monopoly situation exposed to pressure from possible new entrants. In 
contestable markets, the natural monopoly might not be sustainable, if its cost structure 
enables other firms to gain profits by entering the market. Baumol et al.13 define a contestable 
market as a market where “...potential entrants can, without restriction serve the same market 
demands and use the same productive techniques as those available to the incumbent firms”. 
Thus, in the contestable markets a monopoly company can earn zero profits and has to 
function efficiently because of the possibility of new entrants14. However, Baumol et al.15  
reason that if “...entry requires the sinking of substantial costs, it will not be reversible, 
because the sunk costs are not recoverable.” Therefore, entry can be assumed reversible and 
markets contestable only if operations require no sunk cost. Thus, in the electricity transport 
business the markets are commonly not contestable. 
The concept of market barriers becomes relevant in a situation where there are dependencies 
between two markets which is the case in the electricity sector, where the competitive 
production and supply sectors depend on the distribution and transmission monopoly. The 
concept of market barriers concentrates on the investigation of the comparative advantage and 
the market power of an incumbent company compared to a potential newcomer. According to 
Bain16 the incumbent firms can, due to market barriers, continuously set their prices above the 
level of minimum average cost without the risk of new entrants. This causes inefficiencies and 
welfare losses in the markets. The main cause for market barriers is therefore the denied or 
hampered access to the input factors. In the electricity industry, the distribution of electricity 
can be seen as an input of the service of providing the customers with electricity. A high entry 
fee to the distribution network e.g. can be considered a market barrier to a disadvantage of an 
independent power producer who faces few buyers with market power. 
                                                             
12 1998, p. 42 
13 1982, p. 5 
14 Baumol et al. 1982, pp. 5-6 
15 1982, p. 7 
16 1968, p. 253 
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Another concept for the analysis of natural monopolies is network access, where it can be 
distinguished between monetary access and other conditions. Monetary access refers to prices 
that power companies have to pay in order to get the right to use the grid. The general criteria 
state that access prices should be non-discriminating, transparent and based on the true cost of 
the maintenance. They may also have a signal or a steering function to increase the efficiency 
of the grid use. The principle that the firm pays the cost that it has caused is reasonable but 
sounds simpler than it is because the allocation of costs to the individual customers is 
difficult17. Other access conditions refer e.g. to the physical characteristics of the infused and 
diverted power, the details of the connection contract, metering services etc. In most 
countries, there is a set of complicated rules and regulations to manage these conditions18. 
The above described issues of natural monopolies and vertical integration cause inefficiencies 
and thus make a case for regulation19. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
 
2.4 REGULATION 
In general, regulation occurs when the government believes that the company, left to its own 
devices, would behave in a way that is contrary to the social optimum. In Europe, the initial 
reaction to this problem was government provision of an utility service. However, this 
approach raised its own problems. Some governments used the state-provided utility services 
to pursue political agendas, as a source of cash flow for funding other government activities, 
or as a means of obtaining hard currency. These and other consequences of state provision of 
services often resulted in inefficiency and poor service quality20. 
Another regulatory approach is to oblige private companies that are natural monopolies to be 
listed on the stock market. This ensures they are subject to financial transparency 
requirements, and maintains the threat of a takeover if a company is mismanaged, thus 
ensuring that companies are run efficiently. However, in practice, the notorious short run 
nature of the stock market may be adverse to appropriate spending on maintenance and 
investment in industries with long term planning, where the failure to do so may not have 
immediate effects but leads to problems in the long run. 
                                                             
17 Perner and Riechmann 1998, p. 44. 
18 Perner and Riechmann 1998, p. 43. 
19 Baumol & Sidak, 1995 
20 Schleifer, 1998 
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Common carriage competition involves diverse electricity companies competing to provide 
services to customers over the same electricity network. For this to work government 
intervention is required to break up vertically integrated monopolies, so that generation and 
supply are separated from distribution and transmission. The key element is that there is 
access to the network for any firm that needs it to provide its service, with the price the 
infrastructure owner is permitted to charge being regulated. Such a system requires active 
government creation of a new system of competition rather than simply the removal of 
existing legal restrictions. 
13 
3 LIBERALIZATION OF THE ESI 
3.1 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The number of research papers published on the liberalization of the Energy Supply Industry 
and the development of electricity prices is quite limited. Most papers published on the topic 
focus on the effect of liberalization, regulation and privatization on electricity prices for 
industrial or household customers. Evaluating a large number of countries these studies aim at 
explaining the development of prices in those countries over time and at identifying the 
driving factors behind price changes. This chapter gives a brief summary of previous research 
done in this field.  
Steiner (2001) conducted a panel study on the impact of regulatory reforms in the ESI on 
retail prices for industrial consumers in 19 OECD countries and on the difference between 
retail prices for industrial and household consumers. The study covers the years 1986 to 1996 
and includes countries on all levels of regulatory reform in the ESI sector. He finds that “...a 
high degree of private ownership and imminence of both privatisation and liberalization tend 
to increase industrial end-user prices”21. The study however also shows that “the ratio of 
industrial to residential end-user electricity prices is reduced by the unbundling of generation 
and transmission, expansion of Third Party Access (TPA), and introduction of electricity 
markets”22. 
Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) conducted a similar study, also using panel data from OECD 
countries. Covering the years 1987 to 1999 they assess the influence of the unbundling of 
transmission from generation, third party access (in retail), wholesale spot markets and private 
ownership on industrial customer prices and on the ratio of industrial to household prices. The 
study finds “that expanded retail access is likely to lower the industrial price, and at the same 
time increases the price differential between industrial customers and household customers”23. 
The unbundling of generation and transmission also shows to be negatively  correlated with 
prices. Hattori and Tsutsui use legal unbundling as their measure. Therefore this result cannot 
be compared to that of Steiner, who uses accounting unbundling. They explain their result 
with the increased transaction costs in the case of unbundling that are being transferred to the 
                                                             
21 Steiner (2001), p. 176 
22 Steiner (2001), p. 176 
23 Hattori & Tsutsui (2004), p. 830 
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customers. For the existence of an electricity wholesale spot market they find a slightly 
negative correlation with prices, an unexpected result. Hattori and Tsutsui explain this with 
spot markets making it possible for generators to exercise market power. 
Ernst & Young (2006) provide a report of a study undertaken on the “The Case for 
Liberalization”. The study analyzes five questions, mainly whether liberalization lowers 
prices, whether it increases price volatility and inhibits investment, whether liberalized 
markets provide a reliable and secure supply and how liberalized markets effectively interact 
with other public policies. They find that the liberalization of ESIs is negatively correlated 
with prices, since “the price of electricity falls by 0.035€/kWh for every unit increase in the 
competition indicator”25. Regarding price volatility the report finds that it is positively 
correlated with liberalization but that volatility has decreased over time. The report also finds 
that there is “no linkage between spot market volatility and consumer prices”26  and sees the 
volatility increase as an essential factor for incentivising investment. For the security of 
supply the study uses measures of outages in the electricity networks and measures of 
diversity in generation. The findings indicate that there was a marginal improvement in the 
reliability and security of supply during the liberalization. This can be attributed to higher 
plant utilization, increased diversity and more interconnections27. Ernst & Young also find 
that liberalization of the ESI effectively interacts with other public policies. Studying 
expenditures on energy as a proportion of income, the energy intensity of economies and 
environmental emissions, the study finds that “liberalized markets can perpetuate other public 
policies and indeed increase the efficiency of implementation”28. 
What distinguishes the study by Ernst & Young from other studies arriving at quite different 
results about the effect of liberalization on prices is that it only uses data on industrial 
customer prices. Since other studies29 showed a positive correlation between liberalization 
and household customer prices, the study by Ernst & Young is likely to over-estimate the 
positive effect of the liberalization of ESIs. 
Percebois (2008) studied the benefits and risks of the electricity liberalization in the European 
Union. The main questions he attempts to answer in his study are whether the increase in 
electricity prices is a result of the market liberalization, whether increased interconnections 
                                                             
25 Ernst & Young (2006), p. 2 
26 Ernst & Young (2006), p. 4 
27 Ernst & Young (2006), p. 4 
28 Ernst & Young (2006), p. 5 
29 Hattori & Tsutsui (2004), Steiner (2001) 
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create surplus transfers and whether the market power of generators is a threat to competition. 
Percebois does not only study the development of prices in the EU countries but also the 
convergence of prices in different countries. As an example he uses France and Germany, two 
countries with a quite different energy mix in generation. Percebois finds that while price 
increases in most countries that have a high share of thermal power in the generation mix are 
due to the increase of the price of fossil fuels, this is not true for all countries. Some countries 
experienced higher prices due to increased interconnection and the existence of spot markets 
for electricity. 
Usually the marginal electricity producers are thermal power plants and hence the price for 
electricity generated from fossil fuels sets the price paid on the spot market. French customers 
experienced price increases as an effect of increased interconnection and the existence of spot 
markets. The price for French electricity is now set on international spot markets. This leads 
to the fact that due to the “interdependence between European electricity markets, some 
consumers bear a net loss of surplus”30. Hence “electricity price convergence between 
countries is not necessarily profitable for all consumers”31. Percebois however also states that 
these price increases in some countries also have positive effects. They make it possible for 
generators to benefit from increasing rents that can be invested in new electricity generation 
plants and to promote energy saving. These are important factors to ensure that the European 
Union will not experience an “electricity under-capacity in the future, which would involve 
more and frequent “black-outs” “32.  
Price increases could however also be an effect of increasing market power and strategic 
behaviour of electricity generators. While suspecting that this is the case, the European 
Commission and the regulators do not have proof of such practices yet. Ownership 
unbundling is one of the measures aiming at reducing the power of the generators although it 
incurs the risk of a weakening of European generators who, due to the liberalization, 
increasingly have to compete with foreign generators that have a monopolistic position in 
their domestic countries33. 
Pollitt (2009) analyzes the regulatory reform in the European Union and draws conclusions 
for a possible reform of the electricity markets in South Eastern Europe (SEE). He also uses 
evidence from regulatory reforms of the ESI in other OECD countries and developing and 
                                                             
30 Percebois (2004), p. 18 
31 Percebois (2004), p. 18 
32 Percebois (2004), p. 18 
33 Percebois (2004), p. 18-19 
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transition countries. Although the paper aims at analyzing the possibilities and best paths 
toward liberalization of the SSE electricity markets, there are some conclusions that are of 
interest for our study. Among the important aspects discussed in Pollitt’s study are the 
institutional framework, regional integration and security of supply issues. Pollitt notes that 
electricity reform “will not be successful unless there is sufficient institutional reform in the 
rest of the economy to support developments in the electricity sector”34. The EU aims at 
harmonizing the institutional standards in its member countries and at fostering integration, 
but with the regulatory reform still being on very different levels in the European countries 
this has not been achieved yet. When talking about security of supply issues Pollitt finds it 
very unclear whether this challenge “will eventually derail the competitiveness agenda 
embodied in the EU electricity directives”35. 
 
3.2 ESI LIBERALIZATION EXPERIENCES 
While the liberalization of the Energy Supply Industry in the European Union has only started 
quite recently there are some countries that have taken regulatory reforms of their ESI in the 
past, among them being Chile, Argentina and California.  
Chile was the first country to liberalize its Energy Supply Industry. Liberalization started in 
1982 when the electricity industry was privatized and vertically and horizontally unbundled. 
Electricity in Chile is dominated by hydropower generation and electricity prices are strongly 
correlated with the water level in the biggest reservoir, “Las Lajas”, making the electricity 
market very vulnerable to external shocks. The market in the Interconnected Central System, 
the biggest of four independent systems in Chile, is managed by the Economic Dispatch 
Load-Center, CDEC. Prices are set using a cost-based system where prices and generation 
volumes are calculated through optimization. Generators are, by law, obliged to deliver 
electricity whenever their plants are available and the CDEC commands it.  
The price they are paid by the CDEC depends on the marginal operating cost of the respective 
plants. Generators that provide capacity during the peak period between May and September 
get a fixed capacity payment. The Chilean ESI is very price rigid which makes it extremely 
vulnerable to external shocks such as special weather conditions. Chile experienced a supply 
                                                             
34 Pollitt (2009), p. 21 
35 Pollitt (2009), p. 22 
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crisis in 1998 and 1999 when during a time of governance problems in the industry such an 
external shock occurred (the weather phenomenon La Nina, causing severe droughts). This 
caused major black-outs and shortages. The regulatory reform has positively influenced 
investments, leading to a high capacity increase. While in the first years after the deregulation 
the market concentration was high, in recent years the market power of the market 
participants has decreased and the HHI index36 has fallen from above 3000 to around 1500.  
The Argentinean electricity sector was deregulated in 1993 as a reaction to an energy crisis in 
1988-89. Prior to the reform the ESI in Argentina was characterized by vertically integrated 
state and provincially owned utilities with frequently occurring blackouts and high 
distribution system losses. The regulatory reform was based on experiences that were made in 
the UK and Chile. Within a few years the government privatized “more than 80% of the 
generation, all of the transmission and 60% of the distribution sector”37. The regulatory 
reform also gave rise to competition by breaking the former state owned companies into 
several independent generators and distributors. The Argentinean electricity market is hence 
characterized by very low market power, a factor that is also reflected in an HHI index of 
1500 for generation and of 1400 for distribution38.  
On the wholesale market, that is managed by CAMMESA, a not-for-profit joint stock 
company, prices are set on a spot market and a bilateral contract market. Spot prices are based 
on short-term marginal costs and are estimated for three different load periods per day. Twice 
a year thermal and nuclear generators submit bids for the prices at which they are willing to 
supply energy at every hour during the following 6 months. These cannot exceed 115% of the 
fuel costs the generators face. The hydro generators must declare their generation capacities 
for the same time period. CAMMESA then determines which power plants are the marginal 
ones at each point in time and sets prices. Those generators having available capacity during 
the 90h high demand period weekly are being paid a fixed capacity payment. 
The regulatory reform in Argentina has created several positive effects. Electricity prices in 
Argentina are the lowest in South America and extremely low in a global comparison. The 
price decreases were (partly) caused by sharp efficiency improvements. Unavailability of 
power plants fell from around 50% to 20% within 5 years and labour productivity went up. 
Generation capacity increased by roughly 4.5% per year between 1992 and 2002 while in 
                                                             
36 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, see Appendix for definition 
37 Pollitt (2008), p. 1539 
38 Arango, Dyner & Larsen (2006) 
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transmission the increase was 2.7 % per year. The low price level might though cause the risk 
of too low investments being made in the future.  
Electricity restructuring in California began in the mid 1990s and was finalized by 1998. 
Before the liberalization the Energy Supply Industry in California was dominated by 
vertically integrated monopolistic suppliers. In 1978 the market was opened for small, private, 
independent generators who were allowed to produce up to 80 MW and to sell to the utilities 
(often through fixed price contracts). Developed as a reaction to the 1970s oil crisis and to 
support alternative electricity generation from wind, solar, biomass etc. these so-called 
qualifying facilities (QFs) became extremely popular. In 1991 the newly established 
qualifying facilities in California provided about 25% of the energy need, thereby proving that 
there was no longer a need for vertically integrated monopolistic suppliers. Additionally, 
California was exposed to a high risk for future under-capacity (due to low investment rates) 
and very high electricity prices (that were 30%-50% above the national average). These 
characteristics of the market lead to the restructuring of the Electricity Supply Industry. 
Implementation of the new regulated electricity system came into operation in 1998 with the 
opening of the California Power Exchange and the establishment of the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO). On the California Power Exchange electricity was 
traded on a day-ahead hourly spot market and market-clearing prices were calculated using 
supply and demand curves for every hour of the day. This system was replaced in 1999 with a  
spot market with three auctions per day that were setting prices for certain time periods on the 
same day. The CAISO was established to balance out supply and demand of electricity at 
every given point in time and to avoid overloads in the transmission system. Due to the need 
for selling and buying capacity to avert black-outs it also held auctions and set prices 
independently of the Power Exchange. From the same year on customers were eligible to 
freely choose their electricity providers. Despite a multimillion public information campaign 
the percentage of customers switching providers was very low, which was due to low 
competition caused by high market entry barriers.  
Between April 1998 and March 2000 the new system was in operation and wholesale 
electricity prices seemed to be stable. The collapse of the electricity market in California 
began in late spring of 2000 when prices on the Power Exchange started to increase sharply. 
Although the wholesale price caps were lowered twice the wholesale prices stayed very high 
during the summer and peaked during December. In January of 2001 the system collapsed 
completely and there were blackouts on 8 days during the winter and spring. The CISO and 
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several market participants went bankrupt. The market collapse was caused by a combination 
of several factors including fuel price increases, poor market design, and the impossibility of 
supply and demand to equilibrate because of price caps and the exercise of market power by 
generators.  
The State had to take over and do spot purchases of electricity and sign long-term contracts. 
Due to qualifying facilities going offline and low hydroelectricity production (caused by low 
rainfalls) prices remained high and blackouts occurred. In June 2001 the crisis was over and 
prices began to fall again. This was due to the decrease in demand by Californian customers, 
decreasing fuel prices and a new design of market auctions forcing all generators to be price 
takers. Additionally new generation capacity came into operation. 
 
3.3 EUROPEAN ESI LIBERALIZATION 
 
3.3.1 DIRECTIVE 2003/54/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The foundation for the liberalization and integration of the electricity markets in the European 
Union was laid in Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in 
June 2003. This Directive set the common rules for generation, transmission and distribution 
of electricity. These include “rules relating to the organisation and functioning of the 
electricity sector, access to the market, the criteria and procedures applicable to calls for 
tenders and the granting of authorisations and the operation of systems”39. The objective is to 
create a single market for the European Union that is characterized by fair competition. It is 
the Member States’ responsibility to take the measures necessary to achieve this objective and 
to protect the rights of consumers. This includes: 
• the security of supply and environmental protection; 
• the supply of customers and small enterprises with electricity at reasonable and 
transparent prices; 
• the protection of end-users; 
• third party access to the transmission and distribution system. 
 
                                                             
39 Directive 2003/54/EC, p. 4 
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Since the transmission and distribution sector of the ESI remain natural monopolies, the 
Member States must designate one or more system operators for the transmission and 
distribution networks. These cannot be engaged in generation and supply of electricity. 
The transmission operators must ensure that the system meets the demands for transmission, 
that there is enough transmission capacity to ensure security of supply, that there is no 
discrimination between the users of the system and that the system users receive all 
information necessary for efficient access to it. Additionally the transmission operators are 
responsible for managing the electricity flow and the interconnection with other systems. The 
distribution systems operators have the same responsibilities as the transmission system 
operators when it comes to security of supply, non-discrimination and information 
management. They also have “to give priority to generating installations using renewable 
energy sources or waste or producing combined heat and power”40. In order to balance out 
supply and demand and to cover for energy losses in the system the distribution systems 
operators buy electricity on the market. Directive 2003/54/EC also rules the timeline for 
market opening, requiring the market to be open for all non-household customers at the latest 
from 1 July 2004 and for all customers from 1 July 2007. 
 
3.3.2 CURRENT STATE OF THE LIBERALIZATION IN EUROPE 
In order to achieve an integrated electricity market in Europe the markets of the Member 
States need to be interconnected. The cross-border trade that is enabled by these 
interconnections will lower market power and make the markets more competitive. This 
should ideally lead to lower prices for the customers. 
Evidence from the European Countries however shows that market concentration is still very 
high in many countries. In 15 Member States more than 70% of the generation capacity is 
controlled by the three biggest generators, leading to a high concentration on the wholesale 
market. Figure 2 shows the market concentration on the wholesale market using the HHI 
index.  
 
                                                             
40 Directive 2003/54/EC, p. 9 
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Figure 2 Market concentration of the electricity wholesale market 
 
Source: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, SEC (2009) 287 
 
More than half of the Member States have a system of liberalized energy markets and 
regulated electricity prices. These are Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Greece. The 
regulation of electricity prices has a negative effect on the efficient functioning of the 
electricity markets. Regulated prices distort competition (by e.g. setting entry barriers for new 
suppliers) and send the wrong signals to the markets. This could lead to a lower level of 
competition and fewer investments being made. Additionally these price regulations are often 
not compatible with EU law. 
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4 LAW OF ONE PRICE 
The integration of regional and national markets is often described using the law of one price 
(LOOP). The theory of the LOOP states that in perfect markets identical goods should be 
identically priced. For the price equality to hold the market must be characterized by 
frictionless consumer arbitrage, profit-maximizing firms and the absence of „tariff and non-
tariff barriers and other related market frictions“41 as well as of transport costs. 
The term law of one price is used when the price of single goods in different locations is 
studied while the term purchasing power parity is used when price aggregates are compared. 
Formally the equality underlying the law of one price can be written as 
(4.1) Puct = Ecc’t * Puc’t 
Puct is the price in country 1 while Puc’t is the price of the good in country 2 and Ecc’t is the 
exchange rate between the two countries42. Equation (4.1) states that once prices are 
converted to the same currency, identical goods sell at the same price in different countries. It 
is referred to as the “absolute LOOP“, since it uses the absolute prices of a good. The second 
formal way of expressing the LOOP is called the „approximate relative LOOP“44. 
(4.2) ∆puct = ∆ecc’t * ∆puc’t 
The approximate relative LOOP states that changes in the relative price of a good traded in 
two countries are offset by changes in the exchange rate between these two countries. The law 
of one price is often violated because trade barriers drive a wedge between prices in different 
countries. Despite market integration international goods markets remain quite segmented due 
to differences in labour costs, tariffs, transportation costs and information costs. Empirical 
studies45 have showed that it holds for very few goods and usually only for goods traded on 
organized exchanges. 
This study aims at analysing reasons for the deviation of electricity prices in Europe from the 
predictions of the law of one price. Electricity that is supplied within one network is of the 
same quality; however there are increasing possibilities for suppliers to differentiate the 
                                                             
41 Mathä (2006), p.564 
42 Broda &Weinstein (2008) 
44 Broda &Weinstein (2008) 
45 Broda &Weinstein (2008) 
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product in order to charge higher prices. Green energy and branding are some examples.. 
Nevertheless, the major share of electric power is still marketed conventionally and thus we 
consider it to be a perfect substitute, a good that fits well into the law of one price. Electricity 
produced in different countries is homogenous as well and imported electricity is hence also a 
perfect substitute for domestically produced electricity. 
Electricity is a good that has some unique characteristics. Unlike other goods electricity can 
only be traded and transported using existing connections. Electricity networks are costly to 
set up on the one hand but have very marginal costs on the other hand, making the 
transportation of electricity cheap. However, the transmission and distribution of electricity 
are natural monopolies, which might lead to higher than marginal transportation costs. The 
dependency on existent interconnections also limits the potential for trade between countries. 
The convergence of prices across countries is hence likely to be slower than in the case of 
unlimited import and export possibilities. This trade limitation comprises a violation of the 
assumptions of the law of one price.  
Another possible violation of the law of one price derives from the difference between 
generation costs in different countries. The electricity generation costs depend strongly on the 
availability and usage of different fuels. While there are countries that have a good 
availability of the relatively cheap hydro power for electricity generation, other countries need 
to import fuels and face high generation costs. The costs of electricity generation are 
significantly different between countries and this might be reflected in electricity prices, 
thereby further violating the law of one price. 
Many countries have liberalized their electricity markets just recently and not all markets are 
unbundled yet. The unbundling of generation and supply from the natural monopoly of 
transmission and distribution enables competition on electricity markets. Competitiveness of 
the market is one of the assumptions of the law of one price. However, transmission and 
distribution will remain natural monopolies, which often are regulated. Unless the regulation 
rules are identical in all countries, this fact will add to a further diversion from the LOOP. 
Additionally, not in all countries customers are able to switch electricity suppliers (yet). 
Hence there are differences in the market power of customers in different countries, a factor 
being correlated with prices. All these aspects of electricity violate the assumptions of the law 
of one price. Therefore it can be expected that electricity prices in different countries are not 
the same when converted into the same currency. 
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5 MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to explain price differences across countries we identify possible factors causing 
these differentials. We construct three model specifications that will be estimated. A fourth 
model is used to test the robustness of the results. All four models are run for differences in 
household prices and for differences in industrial customer prices respectively, yielding a total 
of eight estimations. The specifications are based on equation  
(5.0) Pi-j = c + βX + δZ + ε 
where Pi-j is the price differential, c is a constant, X is the matrix of independent variables, Z is 
the matrix of dummy variables and ε an error term. β and δ are the vectors of parameters to be 
estimated. 
 
5.1 TRADE MODEL 
The first model specification is used to estimate the effect of trade on the price differential 
between countries. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the price differentials 
for household customer prices and for industrial customer prices respectively. The 
independent variables are the natural logarithm of the difference in the GDP per capita, the 
natural logarithm of the distance between capitals and the average of the share of imports on 
total electricity consumption of the country pairs as well as the natural logarithm of the 
difference in energy intensity, yielding:  
(5.1) Pi-j = c + β1*gdp + β2*distance + β3*imports + β4*intensity + ε 
 
5.2 COST MODEL 
The second model specification estimates price differentials between two countries as a 
function of differences in the cost associated with energy generation and transmission. As 
independent variables the difference in the percentage shares of electricity that is generated 
from nuclear power, the difference in the percentage shares of electricity that is generated 
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from hydro power and the country-pair differential in tariffs are used. While the variables for 
nuclear and hydro power are expressed in absolute terms the tariff differentials are expressed 
as natural logarithms. 
(5.2) Pi-j = c + β1*nuclear + β2*hydro + β3*tariffs + ε 
 
5.3 INSTITUTIONAL MODEL 
This model specification estimates the correlation between price differentials and institutional 
characteristics. It includes the following variables: a dummy variable for unbundling, an 
interaction term between distance and unbundling, a dummy for price regulation and the 
respective interaction term with distance, the market share of the three biggest generators and 
the respective interaction term with distance and a dummy variable for new Member States. 
For the regression on household price differentials the difference in the share of customers 
having switched suppliers and an interaction term between distance and switching are 
included as additional variables. The model specification for household price differences is: 
(5.3a) Pi-j = c + δ1*unbundling + β1*(distance_unbundling) + δ2*regulation_hh + 
β2*(distance_regulation_hh) + β3*switching + β4*(distance_switching) + 
β5*three_biggest + β6*(distance_three_biggest) + δ3*eu_enlargement + ε 
 
while for the regression with industrial price differences the model is: 
(5.3b) Pi-j = c + δ1*unbundling+β1*(distance_unbundling) + δ2*regulation_ind + 
β2*(distance_regulation_ind) + β3*three_biggest + β4*(distance_three_biggest) +  
δ3*eu_enlargement + ε 
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5.4 MIXED MODEL 
The fourth model specification is a mixed model including the variables of the three previous 
models. It is used to test whether the results obtained in the individual models are robust. The 
variable for distance is excluded from the mixed model since it is highly correlated with the 
interaction terms, yielding: 
(5.4) Pi-j = + β1*gdp + β2*imports + β3*intensity + β4*nuclear + β5*hydro + β6*tariffs + 
δ1*unbundling + β7*(distance_unbundling) + δ2*regulation_hh+ 
 β8*(distance_regulation_hh) + β9*switching + β10*(distance_switching) + β11*three_biggest  
+ β12*(distance_three_biggest) + δ3*eu_enlargement + ε 
All regressions are run with the software Stata, using OLS regression with robust standard 
errors to control for heteroskedasticity problems. 
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6 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This chapter provides an account of the sources and composition of the data used in this 
study. Chapter 6.1 gives an account of the data sources and describes the variables that are 
used in the regression analysis. Chapter 6.2 evaluates the characteristics of the data. 
 
6.1 DATA AND VARIABLES 
The data used in our study comes primarily from the Statistical Office of the European 
Commission (Eurostat)46 and the Report on Progress in Creating the Internal Gas and 
Electricity Market47 conducted by the European Commission. In the case of Switzerland 
where data is missing we use national sources48. Moreover data on distances between country 
capitals stems from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales49.  
We use household and industrial prices for electricity as our dependent variables. In order to 
be able to explain the deviations from the LOOP we calculate the difference between the 
electricity prices of all country pairs in the European Union50, thus yielding 350 observations. 
The geography of the island states of Malta and Cyprus makes trade with electricity 
practically impossible so that those two countries are excluded from the 27 Member States of 
the European Union. Instead, Norway and Switzerland are included in the data, since trade 
data is available there.  
Eurostat publishes data on average electricity prices over a period of 6 months. Semester 1 
prices are average prices between January and June of each year, semester 2 prices are 
average prices between July and December of each year. We use prices for semester 1 of 
2009. Exchange rates to convert non-euro prices to euro-prices are taken as the average 
exchange rate in the reference period. The end-users are characterized by predefined annual 
consumption bands: we use data on households with an annual consumption lower than 1000 
kWh/a and data on industrial users with an annual consumption lower than 20 MWh/a. The 
                                                             
46 Used for data on: prices, GDP, fuel mix, imports and energy intensity 
47 COM (2009) 115, used for data on: unbundling, regulation, market shares, and propensity to switch providers 
48 Verband Schweizerischer Elektrizitätsunternehmen 
49 http://www.cepii.fr 
50 27 EU Member States excluding Malta and Cyprus, adding Norway and Switzerland 
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prices include the electricity basic price, transmission, distribution and other services, 
excluding taxes and levies. 
The independent variables are chosen with the intention to explain the causes for possible 
deviations from the LOOP. Data on the independent variables stems from 2007. Thus, we take 
into consideration the fact that markets need some time to adjust to the given circumstances in 
order to be able to draw conclusions from the market set up. With data that features absolute 
or percentage values, differences are always calculated between country pairs, in order to be 
able to explain price differences. In the case of imports, averages between country pairs are 
computed and a binary code is applied for dummy variables. A summary all variables used in 
our study in provided in Table 1. 
The energy intensity of the economy is given as the ratio between the gross inland 
consumption of energy and the gross domestic product (GDP) for a given year. It measures 
the energy consumption of an economy and its overall energy efficiency. The gross inland 
consumption of energy is calculated as the sum of the gross inland consumption of five 
energy types: coal, electricity, oil, natural gas and renewable energy sources. The energy 
intensity ratio is determined by dividing the gross inland consumption by the GDP. Since 
inland consumption is measured in kilogram of oil equivalent (KgOE) and GDP in 1000 €, 
this ratio is measured in KgOE per 1000 €. 
Data on GDP and network tariffs is nominal and converted to a common currency (€). Data 
on distance is measured as distance between capitals in kilometres. Imports measure the 
percentage share of imported electricity that is being consumed during a year. Similarly, data 
on nuclear and hydro is measured as the percentage share of electricity that is generated with 
nuclear and hydro power respectively.  
The dummy variable unbundling accounts for cases where the natural monopolies of 
transmission and distribution networks have been separated from the generation and supply 
segments through ownership unbundling. The interaction term distance_unbundling is 
computed by multiplying the variable distance with the dummy unbundling. It measures the 
effect of distance on the price differences for those country pairs where the ESI of both 
countries has been unbundled. The dummy variables regulation_hh and regulation_ind stand 
for the existence of regulated prices in the transmission segment, for household and industrial 
consumers respectively. The variable switching quantifies the share of household customers 
that switched their provider during a year; it is a proxy for potential market power of the 
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suppliers of electricity. The interaction term distance_switching is computed by multiplying 
distance with switching; it assesses the relation between the distance between two countries 
and their propensity to switch suppliers. The variable three_biggest measures the difference in 
the percentage shares of the electricity market for the three biggest generators in the country-
pairs, serving as a proxy for market power of the generation companies. 
 
Table 1 Dependent and independent variables used in the regression 
Dependent variables Description  
hh_price logged absolute price differences between 
country pairs (household consumers) 
 
ind_price logged absolute price differences between 
country pairs (industrial consumers) 
 
Independent variables  Expected effect 
gdp logged absolute output per capita 
differences between country pairs (GDP  in 
absolute prices, converted to €) 
Positive - the more 
similar the GDP the 
smaller the price gap 
distance logged absolute distance differences 
between country pairs  
Positive – proximity 
reduces  the price gap 
imports average of the share of imports in the final 
consumption between country pairs  
Negative – mutual 
trade reduces  the gap 
intensity logged absolute energy intensity 
differences between country pairs 
(measured in KgOE per 1000 €),  
Positive - the larger 
the difference the 
larger the gap 
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nuclear absolute differences in the shares of 
electricity generated with nuclear power  
Positive -  similar cost 
structure 
hydro absolute differences in the shares of 
electricity generated with hydro power  
Positive - similar costs 
structure 
tariffs logged absolute differences in network 
tariffs (measured in €)  
Positive -  similar cost 
structure 
unbundling dummy variable if the transmission 
networks are unbundled from 
generation/supply; dummy=1 if both 
countries unbundled, else dummy=0 
Positive -  similar 
institutional set up 
distance_unbundling distance times unbundling; measures the 
effect of distance on price differentials for 
country pairs in which both have 
unbundled ESI 
Positive -  as for 
distance 
regulation_hh dummy variable for the existence of price 
controls for access to the transmission 
networks (for household consumers); 
dummy=1 if one or both countries have 
price controls, else dummy=0 
Unclear - there are no 
consistent regulation 
rules across countries 
regulation_ind same as above, for industrial consumers Unclear  
distance_regulation_hh distance times regulation_hh Positive – see distance 
distance_regulation_ind distance times regulation_ind Positive – see distance 
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switching absolute differences in the share of 
household customers that switched their 
provider during a year 
Positive - similar 
market situation 
distance_switching distance times switching  Positive – see distance 
three_biggest absolute differences in the market shares of 
the three biggest generators 
Positive - similar 
market situation 
distance_three_biggest distance times three_biggest Positive - see distance 
eu_enlargement dummy variable for the Members of the 
fifth EU enlargement51; dummy=1 if both 
countries are new, dummy=0 else;  
Positive - new 
members may have 
more different prices 
 
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The electricity prices vary considerably across the member states in the European Union. 
Figure 3 shows that the prices for household consumers range from around 0.07 € in Estonia 
and Bulgaria to 0.32 € in Ireland, which is more than a fourfold divergence. Generally it can 
be said that the average household prices are higher than the industrial prices. The average 
price in the EU is 0.18 € for households and 0.13 € for industrial users. Thus, variation within 
the industrial prices is less pronounced, with 0.07 € in Norway and 0.22 € in Slovakia. This 
can be due to different degrees of market power that the household and industrial consumers 
exhibit. The industry e.g. has the option to negotiate long term contracts and additionally to 
buy electricity on the spot markets. Moreover, accordingly to the EU Directive52, they were 
able to switch providers as early as 2004, giving them an advantage over the household 
customers, where switching didn’t become mandatory as early as 2007. This is a first 
                                                             
51 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania 
52 Directive 2003/54/EC 
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indication that the LOOP might be more applicable for industrial prices than for household 
prices.  
Figure 3 Household vs. Industry Prices for Electricity 2009 (€) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Only in few cases does the industrial price lie slightly above the household price, namely in 
Estonia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Lithuania and Slovakia. With 0.05 €, Greece has the highest 
difference household and industry prices. Greece has been liberalizing its electricity market 
since 1999, although the degree of real competition is low due to the dominance of one state 
owned electricity utility, responsible for close to 96 % of electricity53. Greek electricity prices 
for households have been stable over the last 10 years. The average household price is about 
55% of the European average and the fifth lowest among all Member States. For industrial 
users on the other hand, prices have been increasing steadily since 2001 and were about 15% 
above the European average in 2007. 
Generally only in some cases the industrial price is similar to the price that private households 
are paying (Figure 4). Primarily the new member countries like Estonia, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Romania, where the liberalization is only a recent phenomenon, show a small 
gap between the two prices. Older members like Portugal, Finland and Netherland however 
have considerably higher variation, and Norway and Ireland lead the ranks with respectively 
0.21 € and 0.20 € price difference between the household and industrial price.  
                                                             
53 Eurostat  
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Figure 4 Price differences between household and industrial prices 2009 (€) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
There are considerable differences concerning the use of fuel in the generation process. As 
Figure 5 shows, over 75% of electricity in France is generated with nuclear power, whereas 
2/3 of Irelands electricity is dependent on gas as input fuel while nuclear power is completely 
absent from the fuel mix. Other countries are mostly dependent on hydro power (Norway, 
Austria), oil (Estonia) or coal (Poland). Since the cost structure may vary due to inputs costs, 
the differences in the fuel mix are one possible indicator for differences of final prices. 
 
Figure 5 Fuel mix that was used in the process of generation in 2007 (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Network tariffs are paid for the access to the transmission grid; they can be regarded as entry 
prices for the usage of the network. Thus, their height is another possible determinant for the 
variation of final prices. There seems to be a quiet similar cost structure across Europe, with 
the exception of Greece where the tariff is very low compared to the average and a group of 
six countries (Romania, Germany, Norway, Luxemburg, Bulgaria and Italy) that seem to lie 
above average. 
 
Figure 6 Network Tariffs in 2007 (€) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The energy intensity gives the level of dependency of the economy on various energy sources, 
thus being a proxy for the overall demand for electricity. It also is an indicator for the possible 
market power of the ESI where usually a leeway exists when it comes to electricity pricing. 
Figure 7 gives an overview of the levels of dependency of the European economies on 
energy. New Member States seem to have much higher energy input per produced output. 
This is plausible, since their economies still are in a transition process from previously heavy 
and energy hungry industry production towards more light industry and services. Knowledge 
driven Western economies like Denmark, Sweden and Germany are as expected far less 
dependent on energy in their output. With this variable we hope to identify possible 
differences in prices due to the dependency on energy. 
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Figure 7 Energy intensity of the economy in 2007 (KgOE per 1000 € of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The share of imports in total consumption of electricity is reported in Figure 8. Here the 
countries can be classified roughly in three groups: those with low dependence on imports 
with import shares of up to 10 % in their final consumption (UK, France, Spain, Romania, 
Ireland, Norway, Estonia, Poland, Germany), those with moderate levels of 10% to up to 40% 
(Bulgaria, Sweden, Greece, Italy, Finland, Czech Republic, Belgium, Portugal, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Austria), and those with high levels of imports of over 40% (Hungary, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Switzerland, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxemburg).  
 
Figure 8 Import share in electricity consumption in 2007 (%). 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 9 Market share of the three biggest generators in 2007(%) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The market share of the three biggest generators is an indicator for potential market power of 
energy generators. It is thus indicating to which degree the producers of energy can impose 
their prices on the consumers. The share of customers that switch their providers on the other 
hand indicates degree of market power of the customers. Those who are not satisfied with the 
services or high prices are able to switch to another provider, thus imposing some degree of 
pressure on the providers to offer satisfactory services and prices and putting them closer to a 
position where they may act as under the conditions of perfect competition.  
 
Figure 10 Share of customers that switched their provider in 2007 (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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7 RESULTS  
This chapter presents the results obtained from the regression specifications from Chapter 5 
and data from Chapter 6. Section 7.1 presents the regression results for all four models run on 
household customer price differentials. The regression results for industrial customer price 
differentials are presented in section 7.2. 
 
7.1 HOUSEHOLD PRICE DIFFERENTIALS 
Table 2 shows the regression results for the trade model, the cost model, the institutional 
model as well as the mixed model that contains all variables. In all four models the dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the household customer price differentials.  
The trade model explains  around 10% of the variation in price differentials. The coefficient 
for GDP per capita differences is positive and significant on the 95% level. Hence country-
pairs with a higher difference in GDP per capita have higher household customer price 
differences than countries with lower GDP per capita differences.  
The coefficient for distance is also positive and significant on the 95% level. In the sample 
used in this study the difference between the capitals of country-pairs is positively correlated 
with the price differential, confirming the assumption that geographical proximity of countries 
is positively influencing the price harmonization. The difference in the share of imports on 
final consumption is negatively influencing price differentials, showing that countries with a 
similar level of trade have similar prices. This result should however be regarded more 
cautiously since the coefficient for this variable is only statistically significant on the 90% 
level. 
The coefficient for the natural logarithm of the difference in energy intensity is positive, but 
again, this only holds for 90% of the cases. With this limitation, country-pairs with a higher 
difference in energy intensity have higher price differences than country-pairs with lower 
energy intensity differences. 
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Table 2 Regression results for household price differentials as the dependent variable 
 Trade model Cost model Institutional model Mixed model 
constant -6.378 ** (2.91) 
-2.863 ** 
(-19.12) 
-2.740 ** 
(-14.01) 
-4.340 ** 
(-7.35) 
gdp 0.161 ** (2.91)   
0.161 ** 
(2.39) 
distance 0.265 ** (2.77)    
imports -0.589 * (-1.94)   
-0.705 ** 
(-2.13) 
intensity 0.083 * (1.77)   
0.086 * 
(1.68) 
nuclear  0.065 (0.27)  
0.253 
(1.10) 
hydro  0.023 (0.10)  
0.108 
(0.44) 
tariffs  0.028 (0.66)  
-0.037 
(-0.85) 
unbundling   0.381 (0.25) 
0.499 
(0.34) 
distance_unbundling   -0.077 (-0.35) 
-0.092 
(-0.44) 
regulation_hh   -2.877 ** (-2.70) 
-2.825** 
(-2.53) 
distance_regulation_hh   0.417 ** (2.76) 
0.390** 
(2.46) 
switching   -0.552 (-0.20) 
0.370 
(0.14) 
distance_switching   0.101 (0.25) 
-0.075 
(-0.20) 
three_biggest   0.009 (0.38) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
distance_three_biggest   -0.002 (-0.47) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
eu_enlargement   -0.181 (-0.71) 
-0.082 
(-0.29) 
 
R2 0.1020 0.0012 0.0562 0.1181 
** significant at 95%; * significant at 90% 
 
The R2 value for the cost model is very low and has virtually no explanatory power. We will 
discuss this result in Chapter 8.  
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The R2 value for the institutional regression model indicates that it explains around 5.6% of 
the variation. The dummy variable for price regulation and its interaction term with distance 
are the only two significant variables, both on a 95% level. Price regulation is negatively 
correlated with the price differentials, indicating that country-pairs with at least one country 
having regulated prices have more unequal prices than country-pairs in which both countries 
have no price regulation. The interaction term between distance and price regulation has a 
positive coefficient. In country pairs where at least one country has regulated prices distance 
is positively correlated with the price difference.  
The mixed model, combining all variables of the other models, has an explanatory power of 
about 12%. The variables gdp, imports, intensity, as well as regulation_hh and 
distance_regulation_hh are significant. The coefficients of these variables have the same 
signs as in the previous models and hence confirm the findings. 
 
7.2 INDUSTRIAL PRICE DIFFERENTIALS 
The results for the industrial price differentials regression are reported in Table 3. The 
explanatory power of the trade model is approximately 1.6%.  As in the regression with 
household prices the coefficient for distance shows a  positive effect of distance on price 
differentials, however, it is only significant at the 90% level. The logarithms of differences of 
GDP per capita and energy intensity as well as the share of imports are not significant. 
The cost model has again very low explanatory power (around 1%). The only variable that is 
significant is tariffs with a t-value of 1.77, indicating that it is significant only at 90%. The 
difference in tariffs is positively influencing industrial customer price differentials. The 
coefficients for nuclear and hydro are insignificant.  
The institutional model regression has an explanatory power of roughly 2.5%. The only 
significant variables are distance_unbundling and unbundling as well as  the dummy variable 
eu_enlargement. The coefficient for unbundling is significant on the 95% level and indicates 
a negative effect on industrial price differences. The dummy variable unbundling has a value 
of 1 when both countries have unbundled transmission and distribution networks and a value 
of 0 otherwise. This means that country-pairs consisting of two countries with unbundled 
ESIs have more similar prices than other country-pairs. Distance_unbundling is also positive 
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and significant on the 95% level. This means that for country-pairs in which both countries 
have unbundled their networks, distance has a positive effect on the price differential. The 
dummy variable eu_enlargement controls for Member States that only recently joined the 
European Union. It is significant at 90% and it affects price differences positively. This means 
that country-pairs consisting of two new Member States have higher price differences than 
country-pairs with at least one “old” Member State. All other coefficients are not significant. 
  
Table 3 Regression results for industrial price differentials as the dependent variable 
 Trade model Cost model Institutional model Mixed model 
constant -4.890 ** (-6.42) 
-3.627 ** 
(-24.01) 
-3.445 ** 
(1.91) 
-3.844 ** 
(-7.28) 
gdp -0.009 (-1.05)   
-0.0130 
(0.20) 
distance 0.190 * (1.82)    
imports -0.075 (-0.21)   
-0.153 
(-0.39) 
intensity 0.037 (0.89)   
0.036 
(0.84) 
nuclear  -0.131 (-0.58)  
-0.127 
(-0.55) 
hydro  0.035 (0.16)  
0.158 
(0.65) 
tariffs  0.077 * (1.77)  
0.072 
(1.60) 
unbundling   -3.671 ** (-2.21) 
-3.959 ** 
(-2.32) 
distance_unbundling   0.581 ** (2.28) 
0.562 ** 
(2.39) 
regulation_ind   -0.561 (-0.52) 
0.075 
(0.07) 
distance_regulation_ind   0.074 (0.50) 
-0.018 
(-0.12) 
three_biggest   -0.011 (-0.51) 
-0.004 
(-0.18) 
distance_three_biggest   0.001 (0.40) 
-0.000 
(0.07) 
eu_enlargement   0.416 * (1.91) 
0.418 * 
(1.67) 
R2 0.0158 0.0092 0.0253 0.0358 
** significant at 95%; * significant at 90% 
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The mixed model combines the variables of the trade model, the cost model and the 
institutions model. It has an explanatory power of approximately 3.6%. The significant 
variables in this model are unbundling, the interaction term distance_unbundling and the 
dummy variable eu_enlargement.  The coefficients for unbundling and distance_unbundling 
are both significant on the 95% level. They are similar to the coefficients obtained in the 
institutional model, confirming the previous findings. The dummy variable for new EU 
Member States is significant only at the 90% level and its coefficient is similar to that 
obtained in the institutions model. 
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8 DISCUSSION 
Our results show that there are significant differences both in prices for electric energy in 
Europe as well as the factors influencing them. Since the causes for price differentials vary for 
household and industrial prices we discuss the results separately. Chapter 8.1 discusses the 
regression results for household customer price differentials and Chapter 8.2 analyses the 
results for industrial customer price differentials.  
 
8.1 HOUSEHOLD PRICES 
Chapter 6 showed that there is substantial variation in household customer prices within 
Europe. The aim of Chapter 7 was to analyze possible causes behind these price differentials.  
Firstly, the trade regression confirms our expectation that income differences help explain 
price differences, as the data shows evidence that electricity prices reflect the general price 
levels of countries. Despite liberalization the electricity markets seems not to be an exception 
from economy wide price trends. Secondly, similar levels of dependency of an economy on 
electric power produce similar prices. Such dependencies are difficult to change since it 
requires a restructuring of the economy, typically a very slow process. Hence, price 
differences caused by intensity differences are likely to persist. A further factor that is 
strongly affecting price differences is distance. As trade theory predicts54, countries that are 
far apart tend to trade less as distance functions as a trade barrier. This seems reasonable since 
longer distances make arbitrage more difficult and countries that lie far apart thus have a 
bigger price gap. One key to decrease this trade barrier is to increase import capacities. Our 
results confirm this assumption as the trade regression shows that the average level of imports 
has a strongly negative effect on price differences. Countries that trade more have more 
similar prices. Thus, price differences between countries with limited import shares in their 
consumption are likely to persist, unless a common grid with low capacity and transmission 
restrictions can be created. One extreme example of how imports can influence the electricity 
price is Luxemburg. 100% of its electricity consumption is imported resulting in an electricity 
                                                             
54 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
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price (0.24 €) that is nearly identical with the prices of the supplying countries Netherlands 
and Germany (0.25 € each).  
The cost model yielded less significant results. However, what we can say is that price 
differences do not seem to be cost driven, since differences in the generation fuel mix do not 
explain the price differentials in the data. This could be due to the fact that the ESI has 
marginal price setting, meaning that the price is set equal to the cost of the marginal power 
plant (in many cases this is a gas fired power plant). Since most countries use an energy mix 
consisting of three to six fuels and there are only few countries that are almost entirely 
dominated by one fuel source (Norway with hydro, Estonia with oil and Poland with coal 
power), the price differences are not likely to reflect the fuel composition of the electricity 
generation. The model does not detect any effect of differences in tariffs on price differentials 
either. A reason for lack of correlation could be that household customers pay these prices 
only indirectly. 
The institutional model shows a significant negative correlation between the existence of 
price controls in the transmission sector and price differences. The fact that the natural 
monopolies of transmission are not regulated apparently drives a wedge between the prices of 
two countries. In the case of no regulation the monopolists has the option to set prices 
arbitrarily and due to different conditions for network access and maintenance cost on the one 
side and local contract details and rules on the other side they might vary considerably. 
However, there is no correlation between unbundling and price differences. A correlation test 
between the dummy variables for regulation and unbundling showed that there is no 
relationship between regulation and unbundling, meaning that even in the case vertically 
integrated companies are not unbundled their transmission and distribution networks still can 
be regulated and vice versa. According to the regression results regulation seems to be a more 
powerful tool for household prices than unbundling. 
The share of customers that switched their providers does not seem to affect price variation. 
As Figure 10 shows over 50 % of the countries in the sample have a switching rate below 5%. 
This is due to the fact that in most countries household customers did not have the possibility 
to switch their electricity supplier until June 2007. The UK is the country with the longest and 
most successful ESI liberalization history55 in Europe and it has a switching rate of close to 70 
%. The fact that the UK has relatively low electricity prices (13 % below EU average) might 
                                                             
55 Pollit (2007) 
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be an indicator of that supplier switching increases the customers bargaining power and helps 
bring the prices down. The market share of the three largest generators shows to be 
insignificant in the sample. This can be explained with the fact that they possess considerable 
market power of over 50 % in all but three countries56, hence leaving little room for variation. 
The dummy for new EU Member States shows to be insignificant. Thus, countries with a 
longer history of integration do not have more similar prices than countries that just joined the 
integration process. Accordingly, we can confirm our hypothesis that the LOOP does not hold 
for household electricity prices across Europe.  
 
8.2 INDUSTRIAL PRICES 
As Figure 3 shows, prices for industrial customers show less variation across Europe than 
household customer prices. Unlike the case for the household consumers, our analysis from 
the trade regression shows that both GDP and energy intensity differences do not result in 
price differences for the industrial consumers. This is a first indicator of that the price setting 
mechanism follows international markets more for industrial prices than for household prices. 
Moreover, imports do not seem to influence industrial price differences either. This might be 
due to the fact that the wholesale prices follow more closely the international spot market 
prices and thus are less influenced by imports. However, as for the household price 
differentials, the distance between two countries appears to be a significant trade barrier 
increasing the price differentials for industrial customers. 
As in the regression for household customer prices the fuel mix seems to have no influence on 
international price differentials for industrial customers either. The reasoning behind the 
insignificance of the fuel variables applies similarly as in the previous chapter. Furthermore, 
the regression results show that tariff differences are positively related with price differences. 
We suggest that this is caused by the fact that tariffs often are paid by industrial customers 
directly. In many cases there is no middleman between the industrial consumers and the 
industrial transmission system operators which gives industrial wholesale consumers a more 
direct insight into the market. Consequently, the transmission system operators have fewer 
options to charge a mark-up after the tariffs thus making sure that countries with similar tariff 
                                                             
56 exceptions are Norway, Switzerland and the UK; Figure 9 
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levels also have similar prices. This relative transparency in price setting also renders the 
existence of regulation more unimportant.  
Unbundling has a negative influence on price differences. That means that country pairs in 
which both countries have unbundled their transmission networks from the rest of the ESI 
have more similar prices. This is due to the fact that these country pairs have more similar 
market structures and that the unbundling reduces the market power of the individual 
companies leading to more competition and price convergence. What is more, the share of the 
three biggest generators appears to be insignificant as in the regression with household prices.  
The dummy variable for EU enlargement is positively correlated with price differences. This 
means that the new Member States that only recently joined the common European electricity 
market have bigger price differences than old Member States, which might be due to the fact 
that the new Member States developed their ESI independently and were not subject to the 
harmonization process. The old Members have more similar prices since they have been 
exposed to liberalization process for a longer time, which indicates that the LOOP apparently 
does work better for the industrial prices than for the household prices.  
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this study was to test whether the law of one price holds for the European 
Electricity Supply Industry. Additionally it aimed at identifying factors behind possible price 
differences. The descriptive statistics showed that the variation of prices is greater for 
household consumers when compared to industrial buyers of electricity, which served as a 
first indication for the LOOP being more applicable to the industrial rather than the household 
market. Drawing on this finding we construct a model for explaining price differentials with 
the differences in trade, cost and institutional factors in the European countries that were 
included in our analysis.  
The regression analysis that was run separately for household and industrial price differentials 
showed that there is a number of factors that significantly influence the differences in prices 
for electric power across European countries. One factor that showed big influence on both 
types of prices was distance between the trading countries, thus confirming conventional trade 
theory - countries that lie closer simply trade more. Another finding that is similar to both the 
household and the industrial prices is that price differences are not driven by the respective 
fuel costs. While at first glance a surprising result it can easily be rationalized by the existing 
practice of price setting for electricity, where the prices are set according to marginal fuel 
costs.  
For household customers a number of variables showed significant influence on price 
differentials. Imports and the existence of price controls for the transmission networks tend to 
close price gaps across countries. However, differences in GDP and energy intensity have the 
opposite effect. Additionally we do not find any signs of convergence for countries that have 
been exposed to liberalization for longer time, thus giving further evidence of the LOOP 
being violated for household prices. 
For industrial customers similar levels of network tariffs as well as network unbundling 
decrease price differences. Moreover, we find a strong positive effect of liberalization and 
regional integration on price divergence. The data showed that new Member States had 
significantly higher levels of price differentials than the old Member States. This is a strong 
conformation that the LOOP is more applicable to electricity prices for industrial customers of 
the Electricity Supply Industry.  
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11 APPENDIX 
 
Figure 11   Power Transport from Generation to Customers 
 
Source: US Department of Energy 
 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index57 
The HHI measures the size of firms relative to the industry and can be seen as a measure of 
competition in industries. It can be calculated with the following formula: 
 
S denotes the market share of firm i and N the number of firms in the market. 
For the interpretation of the HHI the following scale is used: 
Below 100: indicates a highly competitive market 
Between 101 and 1000: unconcentrated market 
Between 1001 and 1800: moderate market concentration 
Above 1800: high market concentration 
                                                             
57 Miller (1982) 
